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INTRODUCTION
It is widely agreed that there should be less reliance by
investors and market participants on credit ratings. A more
contentious issue, however, concerns how this goal is to be
achieved. Reliance on ratings may escalate into
overreliance when ratings are perceived by investors as the
exclusive benchmark for assessing asset qualities. The risk
related to this perception is twofold.
First, investors are not incentivized to pursue their own
internal credit risk assessment and to undertake proper
due diligence. Second, mechanistic and parallel reliance on
ratings can cause herd behaviour and cliff-edge effects, that
is, simultaneous sales of debt instruments when their
rating is downgraded below a certain threshold. The recent
financial crisis and, above all, the current sovereign debt
crisis, are regarded as examples of this phenomenon.
Hence, overreliance has the potential to exacerbate the
financial instability of individual countries with possible
spill-over effects at global level.
In 2010 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued a set
of principles to deal with such a problem. The proposed
strategy is based on two levels of action: (i) encouraging
market participants to perform their own due diligence
and internal risk management; and (ii) revisiting in the
regulatory framework those references to ratings which
may negatively influence investors due to their potentiality
to be regarded as a public endorsement of
creditworthiness. So far, the translation of the two-
pronged approach has made very little progress at national,
regional and international levels.
This short article illustrates the reasons why the
proposed approach is failing to achieve its objectives. In
doing so, it will discuss overreliance on credit ratings and
the strategy advanced to address this problem, including its
drawbacks and how it is perceived by CRAs and users of
ratings. Significantly, the approach is considered as ill-
advised and as an overreaction by the users of ratings.
Consequently, this article suggests that the debate on
excessive reliance should re-start on new bases.
OVERRELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS
Sources and implications
CRAs provide forward-looking opinions on the
probability that the issuer of a debt-liability security will
default on the due repayment. CRAs play a key role in the
financial system through the performance of information,
monitoring and certification services.
The information service is said to have the advantage of
reducing information costs, increasing the pool of
potential borrowers and promoting liquid markets since it
reduces information asymmetries between issuers and
investors.
Outlook and watch procedures, on the other hand, are
part of the monitoring service and work as signals to
issuers of possible downgrades so that they can take all the
necessary actions to avoid them.
In addition, the theoretical literature focuses on the
certification role of credit ratings, that is to say, the
hardwiring of ratings into financial contracts and regulations.
For instance, ratings are embedded into the investment
mandates of life insurers, pension funds and mutual funds.
Also, access to some financial markets is restricted to issuers
having ratings above a certain threshold. Furthermore, many
financial contracts include rating triggers which accelerate
debt repayment or terminate credit availability in the event
that the debtor’s creditworthiness shifts from investment to
speculative grade.
The hardwiring of credit ratings into legislative
provision, regulatory frameworks and financial contracts
may lead to undue reliance by investors and market
participants. Favourable credit ratings may be perceived by
investors and market participants as a seal of approval of
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creditworthiness and result in investors not performing
their own risk assessments and due diligence. Relying
mechanistically and exclusively on external credit ratings
also has negative implications in terms of herd behaviour
and cliff-edge effects. While herd behaviours represent the
systematic and erroneous decision-making by a group,
cliff-effects are concerned with the simultaneous sell-off of
securities in case of abrupt downgrades.
When rating changes occur, a downward price spiral
with negative effects on the financial stability across
countries may be triggered too. The recent financial crisis
and the current sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area are
regarded as examples of such phenomena. In particular, it
is argued that overreliance on external ratings has
exacerbated financial instability in individual countries
with spill-over effects at the European and global levels.
Consequently, there is broad consensus at international,
national and regional levels to intervene in order to limit
excessive reliance on ratings and pre-empt any adverse
consequences.
DEALING WITH OVERRELIANCE: STEPS
TOWARDS A STRATEGY
Where do credit ratings proliferate?
In the aftermath of the 2007-09 financial crisis, the
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) argued that some
institutional investors had relied too heavily on ratings in
their investment guidelines and choices, in some cases fully
substituting ratings for independent risk assessment and
due diligence. Based on this premise, the FSF mandated
the Joint Forum to conduct a survey on the use of external
credit ratings by its member authorities in the banking,
securities and insurance sectors.
In the Stocktaking on the Use of Credit Ratings (2009), the
Joint Forum detailed a widespread use of credit ratings in the
legislation, regulations and supervisory policies (LRSPs) of 12
member jurisdictions. In this context, credit ratings were used
for five main purposes: (i) determining capital requirements;
(ii) identifying or classifying assets, usually in the context of
eligible investments or permissible asset concentrations; (iii)
providing a credible evaluation of the credit risk associated
with assets purchased as part of a securitization offering or a
covered bond offering; (iv) determining disclosure
requirements; and (v) determining prospectus eligibility.
Among these categories, the use of credit ratings for
determining net and regulatory capital requirements was
reported as predominant. Moreover, the survey noted that the
North America LRSPs used references to credit ratings more
than in the LRSPs of the EU, Australia and Japan. This can be
traced back to the fact that the USA is the place where the
credit rating industry developed and major CRAs acquired
regulatory power as Nationally Recognised Statistically Rating
Organisation (NRSROs) agencies.
The term NRSROs was adopted in 1975 by the Security
Exchange Commission (SEC) for determining capital
charges on different grades of debt securities under the net
capital rule. On revising the net capital rule for broker
dealers, the SEC required to incorporate only credit ratings
issued by NRSROs. In essence, the SEC’s net capital rule
required write-downs on the broker dealers’ balance sheet
for risky or speculative securities. Write-downs did not
apply for securities rated triple A.
However, to avoid a “race to the bottom” in the
provision of ratings, the SEC only recognised the credit
ratings issued by CRAs which were granted the status of
NRSROs. To this end, only the major CRAs operating
before the new net capital rule had this status and were
allowed to release the required ratings to broker-dealers.
Since then, references to credit ratings have become
widespread in federal securities laws, state legislations and
financial contracts.
In contrast to the US, references to credit ratings are
more limited in the EU financial aquis and industry
practices. For example, with regard to the insurance and
reinsurance sector the existing framework of directives
does not contain any references to credit ratings. There is,
however, more widespread use of credit ratings in the
banking sector, and the Capital Requirement Directive
(CRD) refers to the credit ratings provided by External
Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) for measuring
capital requirements under the Basel II standardised
approach.
The two-pronged approach
In October 2010 the FSB issued a set of principles to
reduce excessive reliance on credit ratings. Strategy is
based on a two-pronged approach: first, banks, market
participants and institutional investors are encouraged to
perform their own due diligence and internal risk
management and not to rely exclusively on CRA ratings;
and second, standard setters and authorities are required
to assess references to CRA ratings in standards, laws and
regulations and, wherever possible, remove or replace
them with valid alternative standards of creditworthiness.
This is the operational strategy which is to be applied to
five main areas: (i) central bank operations; (ii) prudential
supervision of banks; (iii) internal limits and investment
policies of investment managers and institutional investors;
(iv) private sector margin agreements; and (v) disclosure
requirements for issuers of securities.
Specifically, central banks are encouraged to avoid
mechanistic use of CRA ratings by performing their own
judgment on the financial instruments they accept in
market operations, both as collateral and as outright
purchases. Banks must have the capability to conduct their
own assessment of the creditworthiness of assets and
should satisfy supervisors of that capability. Similarly,
investment managers and institutional investors are
required not to refer to CRA ratings as a substitute for an
independent credit judgment.18
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In private sector margin agreements, market participants
and central counterparties are cautioned against the use of
changes in CRA ratings as automatic triggers for large,
discrete, collateral calls in margin agreements on
derivatives and securities financing transactions. What is
more, the FSB document asks issuers of securities to
disclose credit-relevant information in order to help
investors to make an independent investment decisions.
Finally, the FSB requests standards setters and regulators
to reflect on the actions to be taken to enact these
principles and adapt them according to specific financial
sectors and market participants.
ENACTING THE TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY:
EASIER SAID THAN DONE
In its November 2011 report to the G20 Finance
Ministers and Governors, the FSB summarised the current
status of the progress at international, national and regional
levels as to the endorsement and translation of the
principles. It was claimed that the pace of translation was
too slow and that so far no significant progress has been
made. As I show below, this is due to inherent limits in
both levels of the strategy.
Level 1: Independent credit assessment
FSB Principle II expects banks, market participants and
institutional investors to make their own credit
assessments and not to rely solely or mechanistically on
CRAs ratings. To this end, firms should ensure that they
have appropriate expertise and sufficient resources to
manage the credit risk they are exposed to. The principle
addresses all categories of investors, from large financial
institutions to less sophisticated investors.
Putting into practice this approach is hard for all these
categories. Can small institutions afford to hire
appropriate expertise and deploy adequate resources to
perform their own credit judgment? Credit risk
assessment is a complex process and constitutes CRAs’
core business. CRAs have up-to-date technologies and
resources adequately trained to provide an accurate credit
quality analysis. Most institutions, in particular small and
medium-sized enterprises, cannot afford the same
resources and technologies. It is unlikely that smaller and
less sophisticated investors can undertake the costs
deriving from the set-up and development of an internal
risk assessment model and thus they will continue to rely
on the external credit quality information provided by
CRAs.
Similar considerations apply to large financial
institutions. FSB Principle III.2.a requires larger, more
sophisticated banks within each jurisdiction to assess the
credit risk of assets they hold, either outright or as
collateral, irrespective of whether it is for investment or
trading purposes. Banks should, where needed, enhance
their capacity for internal credit assessment and
supervisors should incentivize banks to develop internal
credit risk assessment capacity.
In essence, this principle fosters a model in which every
financial institution performs its own rating which has to
be then reviewed and approved by those who supervise
CRAs. Again, it is doubtful whether even large financial
institutions are available to undertake the costs related to
the employment of additional resources and technology for
improving internal risk management. Moreover, additional
burden would be for CRA supervisors with regard to the
monitoring of the implementation of different risk models.
Level 2: Removing credit rating references from
legislation
FSB Principle I requires standard setters and authorities
to assess references to CRAs ratings in standards, laws and
regulations and, wherever possible, remove them or
replace them with suitable alternative standards of
creditworthiness. In the USA, section 939A of the Dodd
Frank Act mirrors this principle as all Federal agencies are
requested to remove any references to credit ratings in
regulations and then replace any such references with an
alternative standard of creditworthiness.
Success depends on two fundamental conditions: (i)
global coordination among standard setters and regulators
and (ii) the availability of credible alternatives to credit
ratings.
Even though the FSB encourages authorities to share
experiences in their efforts to reduce overreliance, so far
no sign of coordination has been registered, in particular
between the USA and the EU.
As to the second condition, it has to be acknowledged
that there are no credit risk assessment tools accepted as
credible alternatives to ratings. For instance, some
proposals to replace credit ratings with market-based
indicators such as credit spreads or the idea to introduce a
dual rating approach based on external and internal rating
did not attract any support. Standard setters and regulators
are therefore facing many difficulties in providing credible
alternatives to credit ratings in order to enact this level of
the approach.
As we have seen, both levels have their own
shortcomings. The enactment of the first level may be
jeopardised by cost related problems, while the second
finds its major stumbling block in the absence of valid
alternatives to credit ratings.
THE STRATEGY THROUGH THE LENS OF
CRAS AND USERS OF CREDIT RATINGS
On providing comments on the Office of Thrift
Supervision’s Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
regarding Alternatives to the Use of External Ratings
(ANPR 2010), Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s)
suggested a modification of the use of the measurement 19
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tools instead of substituting one tool for another. CRAs are
essential interlocutors in the debate and their suggestions
are worth being analysed jointly with the opinions
expressed by the users of credit ratings.
From a CRA’s perspective
Moody’s invites regulatory bodies to consider carefully
the extent to which risks to market safety and stability
derive from the simple existence of ratings in regulation
versus how ratings are being used by regulators. In this
respect, it cautions against replacing the use of ratings with
the use of other measurement tools, especially if these are
not designed to avoid automatic triggers. In that case,
excessive reliance would simply shift from credit ratings to
another risk assessment mechanism.
Also, regulators are warned not to neglect the
importance of ratings for financial markets. Concerns are
expressed with regard to deregulating in such a way as to
diminish the importance of ratings, perhaps through the
elaboration of alternative measures that may trigger
mechanistic responses as much as downgrades.
On one hand, Moody’s seems to be not critical with
regard to the proposed approach which, in the first place,
might negatively impact on the business and influence of
CRAs. On the other hand, there is awareness of the flaws
and drawbacks inherent in the two-pronged approach.
Ratings are a fact of life and even if they were eliminated
from regulatory frameworks, this would not mark the end
of the power and influence CRAs have in the financial
markets. Potential alternatives should be elaborated in such
a way as to guarantee the same advantages that credit
ratings provide to market participants and should also be
constructed to avoid mechanistic reliance. However, these
alternatives do not exist or are not widely accepted. This is
the reason why the two-pronged approach does not (and
maybe will never) succeed in reducing overreliance on
credit ratings. CRAs will hardly fear a negative impact on
their role and business as the highlighted limits prevent the
strategy from developing coherently. Hence, the elaborated
strategy results in a slow, costly and time-consuming
process.
Fears from the users of ratings
What is more, the two-pronged approach is viewed with
disfavour by the users of credit ratings who perceive it as a
ban on using credit ratings, especially the provision
concerning the elimination of credit references from
legislation. As mentioned above, section 939A of the Dodd
Frank Act requires US Federal agencies to remove credit
rating references from their regulations and replace them
with other standards of creditworthiness. To this end, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB),
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), (collectively the
agencies), have issued their Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking Regarding Alternatives to the Use of Credit
Ratings in the Risk-Based Capital Guidelines of the Federal
Banking Agencies (ANPR 2010), in which suggestions on
potential alternatives to credit ratings are encouraged.
Until now, everyone has agreed that credit ratings
cannot be eliminated. For instance, The American
Securitization Forum (ASF 2010) argues that overreliance
can be tackled by improving the regulation of the use of
credit rating and the supervision of CRAs. ASF warns that
removing credit ratings from the risk-based capital rules
could have a significant impact on liquidity in the ABS
markets which rely upon the ability of investors to make
real-time decisions at the point of initial offering or
subsequent secondary market purchase. Hence,
eliminating credit ratings from these rules may jeopardise
the ability of a large number of banking organisations to
participate in the asset backed securities (ABS) markets,
substantially reducing market liquidity.
The American Bankers Association (ABA 2012)
expressed similar concerns. ABA underlines the
international use and broad acceptance across the markets
of credit ratings. Abandoning completely the use of credit
ratings in the capital rules adopted by the US regulators
could have significant negative implications for the
adoption of the internationally agreed Basel III standards
and lead to competitive distortions across the international
banking industries. For these reasons, ABA refers to the
provisions of section 939A as ill-advised and overreacting.
The Security Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA 2012) emphasises the importance of credit ratings
in the capital markets’ determination of the
creditworthiness of an issuer in measuring regulatory
capital since they are transparent, easily comparable and
easily available. Accordingly, potential new standards of
creditworthiness must be additional or complementary to
credit ratings and should not be conceived as the
subterfuge to prohibit credit ratings.
RESTARTING THE DIALOGUE ON
OVERRELIANCE
Broadening the concept of overreliance, improving
investors’ education, importance of ratings, three
essential pillars
Cost-related problems, the impossibility of finding valid
alternatives to credit ratings, as well as a lack of consensus
among the users of ratings, are the reasons why the strategy
brought forward to address overreliance remains on paper.
Consequently, the debate on overreliance should re-start
on new bases.
Firstly, limiting the concept of overreliance to the
regulatory use of ratings is reductive. Overestimation of
credit ratings can also arise because of insufficient investor
education on the nature and functions of credit ratings.
Credit ratings are opinions which help reduce information20
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asymmetries, they do not eliminate them. Thinking that
credit ratings may have such a potentiality leads to
misperceptions, and also generates overreliance. For
example, the perfect storm of the 2007-09 financial crisis
was, among other factors, caused by investors’ behaviour in
believing that the ratings of the tranches of structured
products they were buying covered not only credit risk but
also market and liquidity risks. Overreliance is a wide
concept which includes the consideration of ratings as a seal
of approval of credit quality from regulators as well as the
misperceptions deriving from ignorance about the nature,
purpose and functions of them. Therefore, it would be
desirable for the debate on overreliance to consider how to
effectively improve the investors’ education on credit ratings.
Secondly, the message which came from the users of
ratings should be of input to bear in mind that it is
reasonable to contrast overreliance to the extent that it is
unrealistic to believe that investors will stop relying on
ratings as sources of information. Therefore, the
significance of credit ratings must never be neglected in any
regulatory debate involving CRAs.
CONCLUSIONS
This short article illustrates the drawbacks of the FSB’s
two-pronged approach as a strategy elaborated to deal with
the negative implications deriving from excessive reliance
on credit ratings. Such limits are the reasons why
translation of the guidelines provided by the FSB is stalling
at national, regional and international levels.
In general, overreliance is among the issues addressed by
the regulatory debate on CRAs in the aftermath of the
financial crisis. Before the crisis, CRAs came under fire
because of their role in some corporate scandals, notably in
Enron’s default (rated triple A until four days before the
company filed for bankruptcy). The current sovereign debt
crisis and the recent downgrades applied to some EU
Member States have exacerbated the regulatory debate on
CRAs.
Factual errors, interference in the political process as
well as an anti-European bias from the major US CRAs are
now the reasons why regulation is deemed to be necessary.
In such a context the danger is that possible reforms on
CRAs may be influenced by a trend to overreact.
In the case of overreliance, it would be interesting to
discuss the extent to which the FSB’s two-pronged
approach, in particular the provision requiring the
elimination of credit rating references from legislations and
regulatory frameworks, might have been influenced by an
anti-CRA bias. The negative opinions expressed by the
users of ratings seem to corroborate this. Be that as it may,
the inherent limits that both levels of the approach have, as
well as the fear of being banned from using them raised by
the users of ratings, provide compelling reasons for the
adoption of new strategies to deal with what still remains a
“live” issue.
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